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ABSTRACT
East Asian countries have become much more active in utilizing the WTO dispute settlement system
to assert their legal rights. The dispute settlement experience so far for these countries has shown
strong tendency of domestic governments to defend economic interest of major industries. Their
primary counterparts in trade disputes are still major developed countries such as the United States
and the European Communities. Thailand is in some sense peculiar in that it brought
disproportionately many complaints to the WTO dispute settlement system while it was hardly
challenged by other Members. In contrast to the GATT era, Korea has become legally very
aggressive under the WTO system. It is also noted that Japan has been rarely challenged since
October 1998. Except for China, most East Asian countries lack the national procedure to link
private economic interests to the WTO dispute settlement procedures.
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  On January 13, 1995 when few experts could fully understand the newly established 
dispute settlement mechanism under the WTO, Singapore submitted the consultation request for 
dispute settlement against Malaysia concerning import prohibitions on polyethylene and 
polypropylene.
1 It was the very beginning of the WTO dispute settlement system that is the 
essence of the current world trading system.
2 This case was subsequently resolved with 
mutually agreed solution and so notified on July 19, 1995.   
  This birth history of the WTO dispute settlement showed an interesting fact that it was 
East Asian Members that opened the Pandora’s box for the new era in the world trading system. 
Since then, East Asian Members have actively participated in utilizing and augmenting the 
WTO dispute settlement system. These experiences and lessons thereof are briefly discussed 
b e l o w .       
 
 
II.    GATT Dispute Settlements in East Asia 
 
GATT/WTO Accession   
 
Among East Asian Members, China was in fact one of the drafting Members of the 
GATT and joined the GATT in 1948. Then, Indonesia joined the GATT not by accepting the 
Protocol of Provisional Application, but instead by succeeding contracting party status under 
Article XXVI:5(c) in 1950.
3  
Japan acceded to GATT on September 1955 and, at the time of accession, 14 
contracting parties invoked Article XXXV. Subsequently, 33 contracting parties invoked Article 
XXXV by succession in respect of Japan when they became liberated from Belgium, France and 
United Kingdom. Three other contracting parties also invoked Article XXXV when they later 
joined the GATT. All these Article XXXV invocations were later gradually disinvoked to 
                                             
* Director of WTO & Trade Strategy Center, KDI School of Public Policy and Management, Korea. I am 
grateful to participants at the Fourteenth Annual East Asian Seminar on Economics, especially John 
Whalley, Da-Nien Liu, Tain-Jy Chen, Takatoshi Ito and Andrew Rose for their insightful comments on the 
earlier draft. I am also grateful to the research assistance by Hyunjeong Kim and Minjung Kim.     
1 WTO,  Malaysia - Prohibition of Imports of Polyethylene and Polypropylene (WT/DS1/1). 
2  During the very first month of the WTO, only two consultation requests were submitted to the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body. The other case was US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline (DS2) that resulted in the first panel/Appellate Body proceedings. 
3  Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong and Macao also acceded to the GATT under Article XXVI:5(c). WTO, 
Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice (Geneva, 1995), 1145-1146.   2
normalize the GATT relationship with Japan.
4 
 
<Table 1. GATT/WTO Accession for East Asian Members: As of August 2003> 







China Dec.  11,  2001  N  Observer  Y  N 
Taiwan  Jan. 1, 2002    Negotiating Accession  Y  Y  N 
Hong Kong, 
China 
April 23, 1986  Jan. 1, 1997  N  Y  Y 
Indonesia  Feb. 24, 1950  N  Observer  Y  Y 
Japan  Sep. 10, 1955  Jan. 1, 1996  Y  Y  Y 
Korea  April 14, 1967  Jan. 1, 1997  Observer  Y  Y 
Macao, China  Jan. 11, 1991  N  Y  Y  N 
Malaysia  Oct. 24, 1957  N  N  Y  Y 
Philippines  Dec. 27, 1979  N  N  Y  Y 
Singapore  Aug. 20, 1973  Jan. 1, 1996  Observer  Y  Y 
Thailand  Nov. 20, 1982  N  N  Y  Y 
NOTE: 
1. Plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement 
2. Plurilateral Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft (WT/L/434, dated on Nov. 26, 2001) 
3. Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products 
4. Basic Telecommunication Negotiations (annexed to the Fourth Protocol of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services) 
 
The Korean government first sought to join the GATT in 1950, when it eagerly tried to 
be recognized as an independent state in the international community after liberation from Japan. 
At that time, the Korean government delegation sent to Torquay, England finished the GATT 
accession negotiation and signed the relevant documents.
5 This first attempt, however, failed 
when the Korean government could not complete the requisite domestic ratification procedures 
due to the Korean War during 1950-1953.
6  The Korean government resumed its effort to accede 
to the GATT in 1965 when it vigorously pursued export promotion as the primary element of 
economic development policies. After extensive internal discussion on potential economic 
benefits and costs, the Korean government finally submitted its accession application to the 
GATT Secretariat on May 20, 1966, and conducted the tariff negotiations with 12 contracting 
parties from September to December 2, 1966.
7 Korea officially acceded to the GATT in 1967, 
in accordance with Article XXXIII of the GATT.
8 On the other hand, Korea invoked Article 
                                             
4 WTO,  Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice (Geneva, 1995), 1034-1036. 
5 GATT,  Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (hereinafter ‘BISD’), Vol. II (1952) 33-34. At that 
meeting, Austria, Peru, Philippines and Turkey also finished the accession negotiation. While Austria, 
Peru and Turkey formally became contracting parties in 1951, the Philippines formally joined the GATT 
on 27 December 1979.   
6  Tae-Hyuk Hahm, ‘Reflections on the GATT Accession Negotiations’, Diplomatic Negotiation Case 94-
1 (1994, in Korean), at 5. 
7  The Working Party for Korea’s accession included 14 contracting parties. Hahm, above n. 6, 23.   
8  GATT, ‘Korea – Accession under Article XXXIII: Decision of 2 March 1967’, BISD, No.15 (1968) 60.   3





12. These Article XXXV invocations were all simultaneously withdrawn in 
September 1971.
13   
  Korea began its formal participation as a contracting party at the Tokyo Round of the 
multilateral trade negotiation, although it was merely as a minor player.
14 Subsequently, Korea 
joined the four so-called ‘Side Codes’: Subsidies Code
15, Standards Code
16, Customs Valuation 
Code
17 and Anti-Dumping Code
18. Korea had never joined the sectoral agreements on bovine 
meat, dairy products and civil aircraft, nor the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures as a 
plurilateral agreement. Korea joined the Agreement on Government Procurement during the 
Uruguay Round and implemented it only from January 1, 1997, while all other signatories 
except for Hong Kong applied it from January 1, 1996.
19 
China was one of 23 original GATT contracting parties and signed the Protocol of 
Provisional Application on April 21, 1947. Subsequently, China participated in the first two 
rounds of multilateral trade negotiation, Geneva and Annecy Rounds. After the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) was founded on October 1, 1949, the Taiwan authorities withdrew 
from the GATT in the name of the Republic of China. This withdrawal came into effect on May 
5, 1950. China tried to resume its GATT relations after it secured a seat at the UN in October 
1971. In January 1984, the PRC became a Member of the GATT Committee on Textiles and in 
November 1984, an observer to the GATT Council and other subsidiary meetings. 
  On July 10, 1986, the PRC officially applied to resume China’s status as a contracting 
                                             
9  GATT, L/2783 (1967). 
10 GATT,  L/2783  (1967). 
11 GATT,  L/2874  (1967) 
12 GATT,  L/2783  (1967). 
13  GATT, L/3580 (1971). See also WTO, above n. 7, at 1034-1036. On the other hand, it is noted that 50 
contracting parties invoked Article XXXV in respect of Japan at its accession in 1955. Ibid. 
14  Chulsu Kim, ‘Korea in the Multilateral Trading System: From Obscurity to Prominence’, in The 
Kluwer Companion to the WTO Agreement (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, forthcoming). 
15  The Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII. In Korea, it was 
signed on 10 June 1980 and entered into force on 10 July 1980 as Treaty No. 709. See Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Compilation of Multilateral Treaties, Vol.5 (in Korean). 
16  The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. In Korea, it was signed on 3 September 1980 and 
entered into force on 2 October 1980 as Treaty No. 715. Ibid. 
17  The Agreement on Implementation of Article VII. The Customs Valuation Code entered into force on 1 
January 1981 while the other three Codes entered into force on 1 January 1980. GATT, BISD, No.28 
(1982) 40. In Korea, it was entered into force on 6 January 1981 as Treaty No. 729. Ministry of foreign 
Affairs, above n.22. 
18  The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI. Korea accepted the Anti-Dumping Code on 24 
February 1986 and the Code entered into force for Korea on 26 March 1986 as Treaty No. 877. GATT, 
BISD, No.33 (1987) 207. See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Compilation of Multilateral Treaties, Vol.8 
(in Korean). 
19  WTO, Agreement on Government Procurement, Article XXIV:3. Hong Kong also had one more year 
for implementation to apply from 1 January 1997.       4
party and the Working Party on China’s accession was established on March 4, 1987.
20 The 
Working Party included 68 Members to be the biggest working party for GATT/WTO accession. 
Since then, China sent a delegation to the Uruguay Round negotiations and finally the head of 
the Chinese delegation signed the final documents of the Uruguay Round along with the other 
125 Member countries.
21 Therefore, the Uruguay Round agreements are supposed to apply to 
China once it becomes a formal Member to the WTO. For bilateral negotiations concerning the 
China’s accession, 37 Members requested negotiations with China.
22 China finally finished its 
accession negotiations with all those Members and signed the Membership agreement on 
November 11, 2001.
23 Having completed the domestic ratification procedure for its WTO 
accession on August 25, 2000, China becomes a formal Member on December 11, 2001, 30 
days after the accession approval. 
China committed, upon accession, to comply with the TRIMs Agreement, without 
recourse to the provisions of Article 5 of the TRIMs Agreement and to eliminate all subsidy 
programs falling within the scope of Article 3 of the SCM Agreement. In addition, China shall 
not maintain or introduce any export subsidies on agricultural products. Therefore, China did 
not get any special waiver period as a developing country. Moreover, the importing WTO 
Member may use a methodology that is not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or 
costs in China if the producers under investigation cannot clearly show that market economy 
conditions prevail in the industry producing the like product with regard to manufacture, 
production and sale of that product. Once China has established, under the national law of the 
importing WTO Member, that it is a market economy, the above provision shall be terminated 
provided that the importing Member's national law contains market economy criteria as of the 
date of accession. In any event, the provisions of non-market economy shall expire 15 years 
after the date of accession.   
In addition, China agreed to accept so-called “Transitional Product-Specific Safeguard 
Mechanism” against its products in cases where products of Chinese origin are being imported 
into the territory of any WTO Member in such increased quantities or under such conditions as 
to cause or threaten to cause market disruption to the domestic producers of like or directly 
                                             
20  More technically, the China’s application for accession was not to re-enter the GATT, but to resume a 
contracting party status of the GATT. The Chairman of the Working Party was Mr. P-L. Girard from 
Switzerland. GATT, C/M/207.   
21  Yang Guohua & Cheng Jin, “The Process of China’s Accession to the WTO”, 4 Journal of 
International Economic Law 297, 304 (2001). 
22  These countries include: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, European Communities, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Kirghizstan, Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, 
Singapore, Slovakia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, the United states, 
and Venezuela. 
23  The Chinese Membership agreement runs to 1,500 pages, and weighs 13 kilograms. <http://www-
chil.wto-ministerial.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/min01_11nov_e.htm>.   5
competitive products. The accession protocol of china defines that “market disruption shall exist 
whenever imports of an article, like or directly competitive with an article produced by the 
domestic industry, are increasing rapidly, either absolutely or relatively, so as to be a significant 
cause of material injury, or threat of material injury to the domestic industry”.
24  In other words, 
this special safeguard mechanism effectively lowers the threshold for invoking safeguard 
actions from serious injury to material injury that is normally required for unfair trade cases 
such as antidumping or countervailing measures. This special safeguard mechanism shall be 
terminated 12 years after the date of accession. 
 
Limited Experience Except for Japan 
 
<Table 2. GATT Disputes Involving Thailand> 
 
As Complainant 
US-Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal 






Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of 
and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes 
US 
 
BISD 37S/200   
 
<Table 3. GATT Disputes Involving Korea> 
 
As Complainant 
EC – Article XIX Action on Imports into the U.K. of 














(adopted on Nov. 7, 1989) 
Cases under Article 
XXIII 
Korea – Anti-Dumping Duties 
on Imports of Polyacetal Resins 




(adopted on April 27, 
1993) 




During the GATT period, formal trade dispute settlements were not frequently utilized 
by East Asian countries except for Japan. Thailand had disputes concerning tobacco with the 
United States as both a complainant and a respondent. Korea was challenged twice at the GATT 
dispute settlement system and brought a complaint against the EC. Other East Asian countries 
were not visible at least in terms of the GATT dispute settlement system. It is partly because 
those countries acceded to the GATT relatively late and partly because their trade volumes were 
not significant during the GATT period. 
                                             
24 WTO,  WT/ACC/CHN/49,  para.16.4.   6
  Japan was, however, one of the most frequent targets for complaints in the GATT 
dispute settlement system.
25 While it brought 12 complaints on 11 distinct matters mostly 
against the US and the EC, Japan was challenged in 28 cases on 23 distinct matters. Among 28 
cases challenged, 13 cases went to a panel and only 6 cases ended with substantive panel reports. 
12 complaints by Japan resulted in only 2 panel decisions. Under the GATT system, the EC and 
the US were the major disputing parties. It is noted that whereas Japan stood against the EC in 5 
cases as both complainant and respondent, the US challenged Japan in 12 cases and was 
challenged by Japan in 4 cases. In terms of a subject matter, anti-dumping measures by trading 
partners were the primary target of Japan’s complaints. To the contrary, import restrictive 
measures by Japan concerning agricultural, textile and leather products were major issues 
disputed by other GATT contracting parties.     
 
<Table 4-1. GATT Cases: Japan as a Complainant
26> 
Case Name  Defendant  Date 
Italian Import Restrictions – Consultations Under Art.XXII.1  Italy  July 1960 
US – Suspension of Customs Liquidation (Zenith Case) – referred 
to a Working Party 
US May  1977 
US – Tariff Measures on Light Truck Cab Chassis – Consultations 
under Art XXII.1 & XXIII.1 
US May  1980 
Austria – Quantitative Restrictions on Import of Japanese Video 
Tape Recorders – Consultations under ArtXXII.1 
Austria Feb.  1981 
EC- Import Restrictive Measures on Video Tape Recorders – 
consultation under Art.XXIII.1 
EC Dec.  1982 
US – Unilateral Measures on Imports of Certain Japanese 
Products – consultation under Art XXIII.1   
US April  1987 
EC – Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components – dispute 
settlement under the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
EC July  1988 
*EC –Regulation on Import of Parts and Components    EC  Aug. 1988 
Korea – Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of 
Polyacetal  
Korea Sep.  1991 
EC – Treatment of Anti-Dumping Duties as a Cost In Refund 
Proceedings – consultations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
EC April  1992 
*EC– Anti-Dumping Proceedings in the Europeans Community 
on Audio Tapes and Cassettes Originating in Japan 
EC May  1992 
US – Provisional Anti-Dumping Measures against Imports of 
Certain Steel Flat Products – consultations under the Anti-
Dumping Agreement 
US June  1993 





<Table 4-2. GATT Cases: Japan as a Defendant> 
                                             
25  The United States and the EC had been the two most frequently challenged countries under the GATT 
dispute settlement systems. The next frequent target was Japan. See Robert Hudec, Enforcing 
International Trade Law, 590-608 (1993). 
26  Yuji Iwasawa, “WTO Dispute Settlement and Japan”, in New Directions in International Economic 
Law: Essays in Honor of John H. Jackson (M. Bronckers & R. Quick, eds. 2000) 473, at 486-488.     7
Case Name  Complainant  Date 
**Uruguayan Recourse to Art. XXIII
27 Uruguay  Nov.  1961 
Japan-Tariff Treatment of Sea Water Magnesite– Consultations 
under Art. XXII.1 
US Jan.  1964 
Japan – Restrictions on Imports of Beef and 
Veal –Consultation under Art XXII.1 
Australia Nov.  1974 
*Japan – Measures on Import of Thrown Silk Yarn  US  July 1978 
*Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather    US  July 1978 
*Japan’s Measures on Imports of Leather  Canada  Oct. 1979 
*Japan – Restraints on Imports of Manufactured Tobacco from 
US 
US Nov.  1979 
Japan – Measures on Imports of Leather  India  April 1980 
Japanese Measures on Edible Fats – Consultation under 
Art.XXII.1 
New Zealand  Oct. 1980 
Japan – Certification Procedures for Metal Softball Bats – 
Dispute under the Standard Agreement 
US Sep.  1982 
**Panel on Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather    US  Jan. 1983 
Japan –Nullification and Impairment of Benefits and 
Impediment to the Attainment of GATT Objectives 
EC April  1983 
Japan – Measures Affecting the World Market for Copper Ores 
and Concentrates-Consultations under Art. XXII.2 and Good 
offices of the Director-General 
EC March  1984 
Japan – Single Tendering Procedures – Consultations under the 
Government Procurement Agreement 
US Nov.  1984 
Japan – Quantitative Restrictions or Measures Having 
Equivalent Effect Applied on Imports of Various Product – 
Consultations Under Art.XXII.1 
Chile Nov.  1984 
* Japan –Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Leather 
Footwear 
US March  1985 
** Japan –Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural 
Products 
US July  1986 
Japan – Restrictions on Imports of Herring, Pollack and Surimi  US  Oct. 1986 
** Japan – Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on 
Imported Wines And Alcoholic Beverages 
EC July  1986 
**Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors  EC  Feb. 1987 
** Japan – Tariff on Imports of Spruce, Pine, Fir (SPF) 
Dimension Lumber   
Canada Nov.  1987 
* Japan –Restrictions on Imports of Beef and Citrus Products  US  March 1988 
* Japan – Restrictions on Imports of Beef  Australia  April 1988 
Japan – Restrictions on Imports of Beef  New Zealand  May 1988 
Japan – Restrictions on Imports of 
Certain Agricultural Products   
US Feb.  1991 
Japan – Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural 
Products 
Australia April  1991 
Japan – Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural 
Products 
New Zealand  Aug. 1992 
Japan – Measures Affecting Imports of Certain 
Telecommunications Equipment 
EC Oct.  1994 
  (28 cases on 23 distinct matters; 13 cases marked with * went to a panel; 6 cases marked with ** ended 
with substantive reports by panels.) 
                                                                                   
 
As indicated above, Japan rarely used the GATT dispute settlement system as part of 
                                             
27  Uruguayan submissions were related to the fifteen contracting parties; namely, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, The 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States.   8
its trade diplomacy while Japan was frequently targeted at dispute settlement cases.
28 During 
the GATT regime, Japan was considered one of those countries that leaned toward pragmatism 
as opposed to other countries, among which was notably the United States, that favored 
legalism
29. Japan tried to resolve a dispute with mutual agreement, rather than actually litigate 
merits of cases through the dispute settlement system. Whereas a sizable number of cases were 
filed against Japan under the GATT dispute settlement system, Japan seldom brought a dispute 
to the GATT until the late 1980s. Moreover, Japan continued its efforts to settle the dispute 
amicably by agreement between the parties even after a case was referred to a panel. Thus, 
among 28 cases brought against Japan in the GATT, only six cases ended with a substantive 
report by the panel. Only two out of 12 cases Japan brought to the GATT dispute settlement 
system concluded with panel decisions. 
  Japan was not very eager to bring a dispute to the GATT so as to assert its rights under 
the GATT. Japan generally tried to avoid having recourse to more confrontational panel 
procedures. It was not until 1988 that Japan requested the establishment of a panel for the first 
time, 33 years after its accession to the GATT. But, after the EC – Regulation on Import of Parts 
and Components case ended with favorable decisions to Japan, the Japanese government 








  The Uruguay Round negotiation crucially augmented the GATT dispute settlement 
system
31, rectifying several systemic problems by instituting, inter alia, a quasi-automatic 
adoption mechanism, an appellate procedure and a single unified system.
32 As mostly 
                                             
28  John H. Jackson, “Western View of Japanese Interntional Law Practice for the Maintenance of the 
International Economic Order”, in Japan and International Law: Past, Present and Future (N. Ando, ed., 
1999) 205, 213. 
29 Yuji  Iwasawa,  supra note 26, 474. 
30  Regarding the historical importance of EC – Regulation on Import of Parts and Components case in 
Japan, see id. at 477. 
31  After the Tokyo round negotiation that established nine additional so-called “Side Code”, the GATT 
dispute settlement system suffered particularly from forum shopping problems. See generally John H. 
Jackson, Restructuring the GATT System (London: Council on Foreign Relations Press; 1990).   
32  For detailed discussion on the WTO dispute settlement system, see generally John H. Jackson, The 
World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence (London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1998); David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade 
Organization: Practice and Procedure (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999); U.E. Petersmann, 
The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Law, International Organizations and Dispute   9
concurred, the WTO dispute settlement system has been working very effectively in resolution 
of trade disputes and become the core part of the WTO system. As of June 26, 2003, 295 cases 
have been brought to the WTO dispute settlement body. Among them, 71 panel and Appellate 
Body reports were adopted, while 44 cases were resolved with mutually agreed solutions and 24 
cases were settled or inactive.
33 One provisional empirical observation is that trade tends to 
increase with more trade disputes.
34  This fact deserves a more rigorous empirical analysis,     
                                                                                                                                  
Settlement (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997); Special Issue: WTO Dispute Settlement System, 
1 Journal of International Economic Law, No.2 (1998); Jeff Waincymer, WTO Litigation: Procedural 
Aspects of Formal Dispute settlement (London: Cameron May, 2002).   
33  WTO, WT/DS/OV/14 (dated 30 June 2003), ii. See also Kara Leitner and Simon Lester, ‘WTO 
Dispute Settlement 1995-2002: A Statistical analysis’, 6 Journal of International Economic Law 251 
(2003).  
34  Professor Andrew Rose found this result using standard bilateral gravity models of trade. His 
provisional finding includes that this result does not depend on which country files against which country. 
I am very grateful to his sharing of this interesting empirical result. More rigorous econometric studies on 
this point will be presented by us.   10
 
<Table 5. Statistics on WTO Disputes by Parties (until 7.31.2003)> 
Members  Number of Cases as 
a Respondent 




East Asian Members 
China   1  1 
Taiwan   1  1 
Hong Kong, China    1  1 
Indonesia 4  2  6 
Japan 13  11  24 
Korea 12  9  21 
Malaysia 1  1  2 
Philippines 4  4  8 
Singapore   1  1 
Thailand 1  10  11 
 
Notable Others 
Argentina 15  9  24 
Australia 9  7  16 
Brazil 12  22  34 
Canada 12  24  36 
European Communities  59  62  121 
India 14  15  29 
Mexico 10  13  23 
United States  81  75  156 
Total by All Members  299  326*   
*Note: The discrepancy between the numbers is due to the fact that, in some cases, there are multiple 
complainants against one respondent. 
 


























Cases brought by EA(36)
<Figure 1. Yearly Trend of WTO Dispute Cases (until 7.31.2003)>   11
especially in respect of simultaneity problem.   
The yearly trend of WTO dispute cases filed up to July 2003 is shown in Figure 1. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, WTO dispute cases were rapidly increased during the first three years 
and then averaged around 30 cases per year. Dispute cases concerning East Asian countries, 
however, show an interesting feature that the role of East Asian countries as complainants have 
increased recently compared to that as respondents. It is also noted that WTO disputes among 
East Asian countries are still rare. Instead, their complaints are predominantly focused on the 
United States while the United States is also the most frequent complainant against the East 
Asian countries.
35 To the contrary, the European Communities has hardly been the target for 
complaints by the East Asian countries, except for by Thailand, whereas it is the second most 
frequent complainant against them.









































                                             
35  As of July 31, 2003, 18 out of the total 36 complaints by the East Asian countries were against the 
United States. On the other hand, 14 complaints were filed by the United States against the East Asian 
countries. 
36  As of July 31, 2003, the European Communities was challenged by the East Asian countries in five 
cases, among which four cases were brought by Thailand.     12
 
A. Japan as Complainant 
  As a complainant, the primary disputing party for Japan has been the United States. Up 
to date, seven out of ten complaints are against the United States. In terms of subject matters, 
trade remedy measures, particularly antidumping measures by the United States, were the major 
issue to be disputed. It is also noted that automotive industry in Japan has actively utilized the 
WTO dispute settlement system to address WTO-inconsistent trade barriers in foreign markets. 
In that regard, it is noteworthy that three complaints against Brazil, Indonesia and Canada are all 
concerned with measures related to an automobile industry. Considering the fact that the very 
first WTO complaint by Japan against the United States also dealt with automobile industry, the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism appears to play a crucial role for rectifying unfair 
competitive conditions regarding Japanese automotive industries.   
        
<Table 6. WTO Disputes Involving Japan> 
 
As Complainant 
US – Imposition of Import Duties on Automobiles from Japan under 
Sections 301 and 304 of the Trade Act of 1974 
DS6 Mutually 
resolved 
Brazil – Certain Automotive Investment Measures  DS51  In consultation
*Indonesia – Certain Affecting the Automobile Industry  DS55  P/AB report 
Indonesia: Certain Automotive Industry Measures  DS64  P/AB report 
*US – Measure Affecting Government Procurement  DS95  Inactive 
*Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry  DS139  P/AB report 
*US – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916  DS162  P/AB report 
*US – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel 
Products from Japan 
DS184 P/AB  report 
*US – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000  DS217  P/AB report 
US – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-
Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan 
DS244 In  AB 
US – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel 
Products 
DS249 In  AB 
 
As Respondent 




Japan – Measures Affecting the Equipment of Telecommunications 
Equipment 
DS15/ EC  Inactive 




*Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and 
Paper 
DS44/ US  P/AB report 
Japan – Measure Affecting Distribution Services  DS45/ US  In consultation
Japan – Measures Affecting Imports of Pork  DS66/ EC  In consultation
Japan – Procurement a Navigation Satellite  DS73/ EC  Mutually 
resolved 
*Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products    DS76/ US  P/AB report 
Japan – Tariff Quotas and Subsidies Affecting Leather  DS147/ EC  In consultation
Japan - Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples  DS245/ US  In AB   13
* Cases for which panel reports were issued. 
NOTE: “P/AB Report” means panel and Appellate Body reports were issued. “In AB” means the case is 
currently in the Appellate Body proceeding. 
 
  The very first complaint by Japan to the WTO DSB, US – Imposition of Import Duties 
on Automobiles from Japan under Sections 301 and 304 of the Trade Act of 1974 (DS6), indeed 
provided the Japanese government with profound confidence in the new system. Right after the 
WTO began its work in 1995, the United States threatened the unilateral retaliation on Japanese 
automobiles under Section 301.
37  Instead of undertaking “negotiations” as previously done, the 
Japanese government resorted to the WTO dispute settlement system by challenging the Section 
301 measures.
38 The United States finally withdrew the Section 301 threat and both parties 
notified the settlement of the dispute to the WTO on July 19, 1995.
39  The outcome of this case 
forcefully illustrated the effectiveness and usefulness of the WTO dispute settlement system as 
opposed to unilateralism.   
 
B. Japan as Respondent 
  As a respondent, Japan has been challenged mostly by the European Communities and 
the United States. It is noted that whereas Japan has been challenged most by the European 
Communities, it has not raised so far any consultation request against the European 
Communities. Unlike other WTO Members, especially the United States and the European 
Communities that have frequently utilized trade remedy measures to protect domestic industries, 
Japan rarely relied on those measures to constrain importation. Accordingly, Japan has never 
been challenged concerning application of trade remedy measures that is in fact the most 
frequently disputed issue under the WTO dispute settlement system. Instead, the challenged area 
for Japan encompassed a range of issues from domestic tax system to distribution services and 
SPS measures for agricultural products.   
Interestingly, complaints against Japan were concentrated during the early WTO years, 
particularly 1995-1997. The last consultation request against Japan was submitted to the WTO 
on October 8, 1998 by the European Communities concerning the management of the tariff 
quotas for leather and the subsidies allegedly benefiting the leather industry and "Dowa" regions. 
The consultation for this case is technically pending yet. Since then, Japan has not been 
challenged by other WTO Members. This may be explained by the fact that complaints against 
Japan under the WTO dispute settlement system have been concerning more systemic issues 
                                             
37  The legal justification of this Section 301 measure was in fact controversial. See John H. Jackson, “US 
Threat to New World Trade Order”, Financial Times (May 23, 1995), at 17.     
38 WTO,  WT/DS6/1. 
39 Raj  Bhala,  World Trade Law, 1066-1068 (1998).   14
rather than case-specific actions such as trade remedy measures that are hardly used by the 
Japanese government. In other words, after somewhat intensive probing by other WTO 
Members in the early WTO years, systemic or legal inconsistency of domestic policy measures 
or legal systems were mostly addressed and modified to comply with the WTO disciplines. 
There remain, therefore, few systemic problems to be addressed at least in terms of the current 
WTO disciplines. 
Among 9 challenged cases, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film 
and Paper (DS44, ‘Japan – Film’) deserves more explanation. This case is so far the only case 
in which the primary complaint is based on non-violation claims.
40  Despite strenuous efforts by 
the United states to vindicate its claims, the panel ruled that the United States failed to 
demonstrate that, under GATT Article XXIII:1(b), the distribution "measures" nullify or impair 
benefits accruing to the United States.
41 This ultimate legal victory for Japan under the WTO 
dispute settlement system, after initiated by positive determination under the Section 301 
proceeding, substantially strengthened the Japanese government’s position concerning its 
domestic trade policies.
42 Typically, Japan has been vulnerable to blames for its convoluted 
non-tariff barriers. But, after this case, the Japanese government has become much more 
stubborn to accept its trading partners’ claims concerning unjustified or unreasonable non-tariff 
barriers, at least administered by the government.     
Under the WTO system, Japan’s dispute settlement has predominantly dealt with the 
United States. In terms of subject matters, anti-dumping measures, particularly by the United 
States, have been a major area for dispute settlement. On the other hand, the European 
Communities brought the most complaints regarding trade barriers in Japan. It is noted that 
Japan has not raised any complaints against the European Communities under the WTO system, 
although the European Communities was the most frequent target of Japan’s complaints under 
the GATT system. It is also noteworthy that Japan is now one of the most active third parties for 
the WTO dispute settlement. As a third party, Japan has showed a strong interest in disputes 





                                             
40  James P. Durling and Simon N. Lester, “Original Meanings and the Film Dispute: The Drafting 
History, Textual Evolution, and Application of the Non-Violation Nullification or Impairment Remedy”, 
32 The George Washington J. of Int'l L. and Economics 2 (1999). 
41  WTO, WT/DS44/R (adopted on April 22, 1998).   
42  For comprehensive coverage of the relevant legal proceedings and documents concerning Japan – Film 
case, see James P. Durling, Anatomy of Trade Disputes (London: Cameron May, 2001). 
43  This part is substantially drawn from Dukgeun Ahn, “Korea on the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement 
System: Legal Battles for Economic Development”, 6 Journal of International Economic Law (2003).     15
Under the WTO system, the Korean government changed a dispute aversion attitude 
and has become considerably more active in asserting its rights through the dispute settlement 
mechanism. Incidentally, since the middle 1990s, the trade balances with those major trading 
partners have been reversed and showed substantial deficits. For example, the trade deficit of 
Korea with respect to the United States began to occur from 1994 and remained throughout 
1997, reaching $8.5 billion in 1997. This trend was again reversed in 1998 primarily due to the 
financial crisis which caused imports to plummet. Although there were some differences in the 
magnitude of the trade imbalances, the overall trends of trade balance were very much the same 
with respect to other major trading partners. The changes in such underlying economic 
circumstances would partly explain more aggressive attitude of the Korean government toward 
formal dispute resolution. 
 
<Table 7. WTO Disputes Involving Korea> 
 
As Complainant 
US – Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Color 
Television Receivers from Korea   
DS89 In  consultation
* US – Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory 
Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea   
DS99 Mutually 
resolved 
* US – Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils 
and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea   
DS179 P/AB  report 
* US – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular 
Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea   
DS202 P/AB  report 
Philippines – Anti-Dumping Measures regarding Polypropylene 
Resins from Korea   
DS215 In  consultation
* US – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000    DS217  P/AB report 
US – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel 
Products 
DS251 In  consultation
US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random 
Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea 
DS296 In  consultation
EC – Countervailing Measures on Dynamic Random Access 
Memory Chips from Korea 
DS299 In  consultation
 
As Respondent 
Korea – Measures Concerning the Testing and Inspection of 
Agricultural Products   
DS3, DS41/ US  In consultation
Korea – Measures Concerning the Shelf-Life of Products    DS5/ US  Mutually 
resolved 
Korea – Measures Concerning Bottled Water    DS20/ Canada  Mutually 
resolved 
Korea – Laws, Regulations and Practices in the 
Telecommunications Procurement Sector   
DS40/ EC  Mutually 
resolved 
*Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages    DS75/EC,  DS84/ 
US 
P/AB report 
*Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain 
Dairy Products   
DS98/ EC  P/AB report 





*Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement    DS163/ US  P/AB report 
Korea – Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels    DS273/ EC  In panel   16
* Cases for which panel reports were issued. 
 
A. Korea as Respondent 
As of August 2003, Korea was challenged by 12 complaints on 9 distinct matters, as 
summarized in Table 7. It is noted that complainants against Korea have so far been raised 
mostly by the United States and the European Communities. The only two other complaints 
were filed by Australia and Canada. Since the Korean government commenced the litigation of 
WTO cases in Korea - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, it seems predetermined to exhaust the full 
procedure of the dispute settlement system, at least if contested by other Members.         
 
1. Settlement by Consultation: Not Yet Ready to Litigate 
Korea was a respondent in some of the very early cases in the WTO dispute settlement, 
which concerned somewhat unfamiliar obligations under the SPS and TBT Agreements. The 
United States made a consultation request against Korea on April 6, 1995 (DS3) and basically 
on the same matter again on May 24, 1996 (DS41)
44. Both cases were suspended because the 
United States did not take additional steps. On May 5, 1995, the United States made a 
consultation request regarding the regulation on the shelf-life of products (DS5). This case was 
settled with a mutually acceptable solution.
45 The Canadian request for consultation regarding 
the Korean regulation on the shelf-life and disinfection treatment of bottled water was also 
settled with a mutually satisfactory solution (DS20).
46  These four complaints were based on the 
SPS and TBT Agreements in addition to the GATT and could be settled promptly.   
On May 9, 1996, the European Communities requested for consultations, alleging that 
the procurement practices for the Korean telecommunications sector were discriminatory 
against foreign suppliers, and that the bilateral agreement with the United States was 
preferential (DS40). The parties also agreed on a mutually satisfactory solution during the 
consultation.
47  
The Korean government basically tried to settle the first five complaints, rather than 
actually litigate the cases. This is partly because the merits of the cases were relatively clear and 
                                             
44  The second consultation request by the United States encompassed all amendments, revisions, and new 
measures adopted by the Korean government after the first consultation request. WTO, WT/DS41/1, dated 
31 May 1996. 
45  WTO, WT/DS5/5, dated 31 July 1995. 
46  WTO, WT/DS20/6, dated 6 May 1996. 
47  WTO, WT/DS40/2, dated 29 October 1997. Korea and the European Communities signed the 
‘Agreement on Telecommunications Procurement between the Republic of Korea and the European 
Community’ on 29 October 1997 and the Agreement entered into force on 1 November 1997. 
Subsequently, Korea entered into a similar bilateral agreement for telecommunications equipment 
procurement with Canada. See also Han-young Lie & Dukgeun Ahn, ‘Legal Issues of Privatization in 
Government Procurement Agreements: Experience of Korea from Bilateral and WTO Agreements’, 9 (2) 
International Trade Law & Regulation 54 (2003).   17
partly because the economic stakes at issue were not substantial. In addition, the Korean 
government was not sufficiently prepared to handle the newly instituted WTO dispute 
settlement system in the procedural aspect and unfamiliar legal issues concerning the SPS and 
TBT Agreements in the substantive aspect.   
 
2. Full Litigation: Fight to the End 
The very first case in which Korea experienced the whole WTO dispute settlement 
procedure was the Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (‘Korea – Soju’) case (DS75 and 
DS84). The European Communities and the United States contended that the Korean liquor 
taxes of 100% on whisky and 35% on diluted soju were not consistent with the national 
treatment obligation under Article III of the GATT. Basically, this case was considered as a 
‘revisited’ Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (‘Japan – Shochu’) case (DS8, DS10 and 
DS11), in which the Japanese tax system to discriminate imported alcoholic beverages over 
shochu was found to be in violation of Article III of the GATT. As a legal strategy to distinguish 
this case from the Japan-Shochu case, the Korean government tried to inject more antitrust law 
principles and experts in the panel proceeding because a large price gap between soju and 
whiskey might be deemed to represent a non-competitive relationship of pertinent products in 
the antitrust law context.
48  
The panel and the Appellate Body held that the Korean taxes on soju and whisky were 
discriminatory and the Dispute Settlement Body (hereinafter ‘DSB’) adopted this ruling on 
February 17, 1999. The reasonable period for implementation was determined to be 11 months 
and two weeks, that is, from February 17, 1999 to January 31, 2000.
49 Subsequently, Korea 
amended the Liquor Tax Law and the Education Tax Law to impose flat rates of 72% in liquor 
tax and 30% in education tax, that entered into force on January 1, 2000.
50 The DSB 
recommendation was successfully implemented a month earlier than the due date.   
This case awakened the Korean public about the role and influence of the WTO dispute 
settlement system. The media and newspapers closely covered every step pertaining to this case, 
from the consultation request to the panel proceeding and the Appellate Body ruling. It was not 
just because this case was the first WTO dispute settlement proceeding for Korea, but also 
because the popularity of the product concerned, soju, was probably incomparable to any other 
product in Korea. Despite objections by the general public as well as by soju manufacturers, the 
                                             
48  For example, the Korean government tried to include antitrust law experts regardless of their 
nationality as panelists, but failed due to the objection by the complainants. Hyun Chong Kim, ‘The WTO 
Dispute Settlement Process: A Primer’, 2 Journal OF International Economic Law 457 (1999), at 465-
466. Except for this case, the Korean government as a respondent did not resort to the Director-General 
for the panel selection. 
49  WTO, WT/DS75/16, WT/DS84/14, dated 4 June 1999. 
50  WTO, WT/DS75/18, WT/DS84/16, dated 17 January 2000.   18
Korean government amended the tax laws to substantially increase liquor taxes on soju, instead 
of reducing the liquor tax on whisky to the original level on soju, in order to eliminate the 
WTO-illegal tax gap while minimizing the potential adverse impact on public health and 
consequent social costs.
51 By experiencing the impact of the WTO dispute settlement decision 
probably at the deepest and widest level of a daily life, this case played a crucial role to enhance 
the WTO awareness in Korea.     
  The first dispute settlement case under the Agreement on Safeguards also involved the 
Korean safeguard measure concerning dairy products (DS98)
52. On August 12, 1997, the 
European Communities requested consultations with Korea regarding the safeguard quotas that 
went into effect on March 7, 1997 and was to remain in force until February 28, 2001.
53 The 
panel and the Appellate Body held that the Korean safeguard measures were inconsistent with 
the obligations under the Agreement on Safeguards. The DSB adopted those rulings on January 
12, 2000 and the reasonable implementation period was agreed to expire on May 20, 2000. 
Korea, through its administrative procedures, effectively lifted the safeguard measure on 
imports of the dairy products as of May 20, 2000.   
Since its inception in 1987 to 1994, the KTC had relied more on safeguard measures 
than on antidumping measures to address injury to domestic industries incurred by 
importation.
54 During 1987-1994, the KTC engaged in 25 safeguard and 12 anti-dumping 
investigations that resulted in 16 safeguard and 8 antidumping measures.
55 After this case, 
however, the KTC markedly abstained from using a safeguard measure whereas it substantially 
increased anti-dumping actions. For example, from 1997 to 2002, there were only 4 safeguard 
investigations but 46 anti-dumping cases.
56 Accordingly, subsequent safeguard actions by the 
KTC appeared seriously disciplined by the WTO dispute settlement system. The safeguard 
mechanism in Korea was further elaborated with new laws and regulations on trade remedy 
actions.
57 
On the other hand, it was reported that the importation of dairy products at issue was 
                                             
51 See generally Korea Institute of Public Finance, Monthly Public Finance Forum (September 1999, in 
Korean) 82-102. 
52  The first complaint brought under the Agreement on Safeguards was US – Safeguard Measure against 
Imports of Broom Corn Brooms. WTO, WT/DS78/1, dated 1 May 1997. This case was resolved without 
litigation although it remained technically pending. The actual panel decision concerning safeguard 
measures in the WTO system was issued for the first time in Korea – Dairy Safeguards. WTO, 
WT/DS98/R, adopted 12 January 2000.   
53  WTO, G/SG/N/10/KOR/1, dated 27 January 1997 and G/SG/N/10/KOR/1/Supp.1, dated 1 April 1997. 
54  On the other hand, the KTC has never even initiated a countervailing investigation to date. See Korea 
Trade Commission, A History of 10 Years for the KTC (1997, in Korean), 280-299. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Korea  Trade  Commission,  Summary Report of Trade Remedy Action (February 2003, in Korean) 1.   
57  Act on Investigation of Unfair Trade Practice and Trade Remedy Measures, Law 6417; Implementing 
Regulation, Presidential Order No.17222.   19
reduced by about $70 million during the period in which the safeguard measure remained in 
force. This result, along with the outcome from Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of 
Footwear  (‘Argentina – Footwear’)
58   case whose proceedings were conducted almost 
concomitantly, raised an important systemic issue for the WTO safeguard system. In the Korea - 
Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products case, the termination of 
illegal safeguard measures pursuant to the DSB recommendation was undertaken only 9 months 
prior to the original due date of the measures. In the Argentina – Footwear case, the 
implementation of the DSB recommendation by repealing the safeguard measure coincided with 
the original due date of the measure. Thus, the experience from these early safeguard cases 
raised imminent need for considering expeditious or accelerated dispute settlement procedures.   
  On February 1, 1999, the United States requested consultations with Korea in respect 
of a dual retail system for beef (‘Korea – Beef II’; DS161). On April 13, 1999, Australia also 
requested consultations on the same basis (DS169). On January 10, 2001, the DSB adopted the 
panel and the Appellate Body reports that held the Korean measures to be inconsistent with the 
WTO obligation. The parties to the dispute agreed that a reasonable implementation period 
would be 8 months and thus expire on September 10, 2001.
59 The Korean government 
subsequently revised the ‘Management Guideline for Imported Beef’ to abolish the beef import 
system operated by the Livestock Products Marketing Organization.
60  In addition,  on 
September 10, 2001, the Korean government eliminated the dual retail system for beef by 
entirely abolishing the ‘Management Guideline for Imported Beef’.
61 Thus, Korea considered 
that it had fully implemented the DSB's recommendation in this case.
62   
The only dispute settlement case concerning the Agreement on Government 
Procurement (‘GPA’) to date is Korea - Measures Affecting Government Procurement 
(DS163).
63 On February 16, 1999, the United States requested consultations regarding certain 
procurement practices of the Korean Airport Construction Authority (‘KOACA’). The panel 
ultimately ruled that the KOACA was not a covered entity under Korea’s Appendix I of the GPA, 
even if the panel noted that the conduct of the Korean government with respect to the US 
                                             
58  WTO, WT/DS121/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000. See also WTO, WT/DSB/M/75, dated 7 March 
2000, at 2. 
59  WTO, WT/DS161, DS169/12, dated 24 April 2001. 
60  Ministry of Agriculture Notification 2000-82. 
61  Ministry of Agriculture Notification 2001-54. 
62  WTO, WT/DSB/M/110, dated 22 October 2001. 
63  This case is the fourth complaint concerning government procurement. The first complaint, Japan – 
Procurement of a Navigation Satellite (DS73), was settled with a mutually satisfactory solution. The 
second and third complaints, US – Measure Affecting Government Procurement (DS88, DS95), were in 
respect of the same issue. The panel’s authority lapsed as of February 11, 2000, when it was not requested 
to resume the proceeding after suspension of the works. WTO, WT/DS88, DS95/6 (dated Feb. 14, 2000).
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inquiries in the course of pertinent negotiation “[could], at best, be described as inadequate”.
64 
The United States did not make an appeal and the panel report was adopted on June 19, 2000.
65 
One of the important lesson from this case for the Korean government was about the 
discrepancy between its organizational mechanism for governmental offices that is based on 
decision making structures and the WTO concession practice that is based on the institutional 
‘entities’ in the context of the GPA. The Government Organization Act of the Republic of Korea 
prescribes various government entities that actually constitute mere positions of certain level. 
Moreover, the Korean government has often established a special ‘task force’, ‘group’, or 
‘committee’ with specific mandates, whose legal foundations are obscure.
66 This issue of how 
to determine the scope of covered entities in relation to a newly established governmental organ 
may require a more elaborate approach in the context of the GPA.             
On October 24, 2000, the Committee of European Union Shipbuilders Associations 
filed a complaint under the trade barriers regulation (‘TBR’) procedure concerning divergent 
financial arrangements for Korean shipbuilding industries. Although the Commission was 
mindful of the extraordinary situation in Korea that was caused by the financial crisis in 1997, it 
found that parts of corporate restructuring programs and assistance through taxation for 
shipbuilding companies constituted prohibited subsidies within the meaning of the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (‘SCM Agreement’).
67 On October 21, 
2002, the European Communities made a formal request for a consultation with Korea under the 
WTO dispute settlement system on various corporate restructuring measures for the 
shipbuilding industry, alleging that they constituted prohibited subsidies under the SCM 
Agreement.
68 
This case was merely the beginning of much more controversial trade conflicts as 
regards corporate restructuring programs undertaken by the Korean government as parts of the 
IMF program to overcome the financial crisis. On July 25, 2002, the European Commission 
initiated a countervailing investigation on the Korean semiconductor producers, alleging that the 
governmental intervention in terms of debt-for-equity swaps and debt forgiveness for pertinent 
companies established illegal subsidies.
69 They concluded the countervailing proceeding with 
35% of final duties. Apart from the EC’s action against the Korean government, the US 
authorities also initiated a countervailing investigation in November 2002 that ended up with a 
                                             
64  WTO, WT/DS163/R (adopted on June 19, 2000), para.7.80. 
65  WTO, WT/DS163/7 (dated Nov. 6, 2000). 
66  Young-Joon Cho, ‘Review of the Panel Report for Korea - Measures Affecting Government 
Procurement’, 33 International Trade Law 127 (2000, in Korean), at 152. 
67  Commission Decision 2002/818/EC, OJ 2002 L 281/15. 
68  WTO, WT/DS273/1, dated 24 October 2002. 
69  WTO, G/SCM/N/93/EEC, dated 12 March 2003.   21
final determination for countervailing duties up to 57.73%.
70 The final duty was slightly 
reduced to 44.29% when the US authorities corrected calculation mistakes.
71  These 
concomitant actions in the two major markets, if sustained in the final determinations, would 
risk the whole fate of the third largest semiconductor producer in the world. Furthermore, the 
legal validity of those actions would have significant implications for many other Korean 
industries that experienced similar restructuring programs in the course of the IMF program 
during the past few years. The Korean government brought complaints against both actions to 
the WTO DSB to vindicate the legitimacy of its systemic and structural measures adopted 
during the IMF program. The outcome of the WTO dispute settlement related to this dispute 
would certainly be an interesting and important addition to the WTO jurisprudence. 
 
3. Overall Comments 
Considering the experience so far as a respondent in the WTO dispute settlement, the 
reaction by the Korean government appears to show a typical pattern of an average WTO 
Member. For half of the complaints, Korea tried to settle the trade disputes without resorting to 
legal procedures. But, as it obtained more experience and the WTO jurisprudence became more 
sophisticated, Korea has become determined to take a more legalistic approach in dealing with 
complaints by other Members.   
When engaged in a WTO legal proceeding, Korea has been in full compliance with 
DSB recommendations. For all three cases in which Korea was found to be inconsistent with the 
WTO Agreements, Korea fully implemented the DSB recommendations within the determined 
or agreed reasonable periods of time, even in politically loaded areas such as taxes and 
agriculture. It is also noted that Korea made appeals for all three cases in which the panels found 
some violations for its own measures. Lastly, it should also be noted that the areas challenged by 
other Member countries are fairly diverse, ranging from SPS and TBT measures to government 
procurement, safeguard, domestic taxes and retailing distribution systems. This is starkly 
contrasted with the cases in which Korea brought complaints, which concentrated mainly on 
antidumping measures. Overall, the dispute settlement experience of Korea as a respondent in 
such divergent areas under the auspice of the WTO has played a significant role to enhance the 
public recognition of the importance of the multilateral trade norms in all aspects of economic 
activities and policy making.       
                                             
70  US Department of Commerce, Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Dynamic 
Random Access Memory Semiconductors from the Republic of Korea, 
<http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/drams-korea-draft-prelim-fr-notice.pdf> (visited on April 12, 2003).   
71  US Department of Commerce, Notice of Amended Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty 
Determination: Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors from the Republic of Korea (C-580-
851).   22
  
B. Korea as Complainant 
So far, the Korean complaints in the WTO dispute settlement system have focused 
primarily on the US trade remedy measures, especially antidumping measures. Five out of the 
total nine complaints concerned with antidumping matters and seven complaints were against 
the United States. Only one case was against the Philippines and the other against the European 
Communities. Two cases were concerning safeguard measures and the other two were 
concerning countervailing duties. In other words, the Korean complaints to the WTO dispute 
settlement system up to date can be simply summarized as exclusive concentration on trade 
remedy issues, predominantly caused by US antidumping measures.     
While Korea had been challenged in the WTO dispute settlement system from the very 
early period
72, Korea appeared quite hesitant to bring complaints against other WTO Member 
countries. It was not until July 1997 that Korea began to use the WTO dispute settlement system 
as a complainant. The first WTO case Korea brought to the DSB was in respect of the US 
antidumping duties on Samsung color television receivers. On July 10, 1997, Korea requested a 
consultation, alleging that the United States had maintained an antidumping duty order for the 
past 12 years despite the cessation of exports as well as the absence of dumping. Subsequently, 
in response to the US preliminary determination of December 19, 1997 to revoke the anti-
dumping duty order, Korea withdrew its request for a panel. On August 27, 1998, the United 
States made a final determination to revoke the anti-dumping duty order which had been 
imposed on Samsung color television receivers since 1984. At the DSB meeting on September 
22, 1998, Korea announced that it definitively withdrew the request for a panel because the 
imposition of anti-dumping duties had been revoked.
73 
  For a similar case regarding antidumping duty orders on DRAMS, however, the United 
States did not readily revoke the orders and, on November 6, 1997, Korea requested the 
establishment of a panel. The DSB established a panel at its meeting on January 16, 1998. On 
March 19, 1998, the Director-General completed the panel composition and thereby Korea began 
its first panel proceeding as a complainant. The Panel found the measures at issue to be in 
violation of Article 11.2 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement.
74 The United States did not make 
an appeal and the DSB adopted the panel report on March 19, 1999.   
  Incidentally, this first ‘win’ as a complainant in US – DRAMS came just 11 days after 
                                             
72  In 1995, three consultation requests were brought against Korea. The first two requests for Korea – 
Measures Concerning the Testing and Inspection of Agricultural Products (DS3) and Korea – Measures 
Concerning the Shelf-Life of Products (DS5) were made on April 6 and May 5, 1995. 
73  WTO, WT/DS89/9, dated 18 September 1998. 
74 WTO  Panel  Report,  United States - Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory 
Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea (‘US – DRAMS’), WT/DS99/R, adopted 
19 March 1999.   23
Korea lost its first WTO litigation as a respondent in Korea – Soju.
75 This somewhat fortunate 
timing of winning a WTO case contributed to alleviating the general concern and skepticism of the 
Korean public about the fairness and objectivity of the WTO dispute settlement system.   
The two parties agreed on an implementation period of 8 months, expiring on November 
19, 1999. At the DSB meeting on January 27, 2000, the United States stated that it had 
implemented the DSB recommendations by amending the pertinent Department of Commerce 
(‘DOC’) regulation, more specifically, by deleting the ‘not likely’ standard and incorporating the 
‘necessary’ standard of the WTO Antidumping Agreement. The DOC, however, issued a revised 
‘Final Results of Re-determination’ in the third administrative review on November 4, 1999, 
concluding that, because a resumption of dumping was likely, it was necessary to leave the 
antidumping order in place. On April 6, 2000, Korea requested the referral of this matter to the 
original panel pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU and the European Communities reserved its 
third-party right. On September 19, 2000, Korea requested the panel to suspend its work and, on 
October 20, 2000, the parties notified the DSB of a mutually satisfactory solution to the matter, 
involving the revocation of the antidumping order at issue as the result of a five-year ‘sunset’ 
review by the DOC.
76 
This case was the first case ever in which Korea won a favorable panel decision 
throughout the GATT/WTO system. Although it took one and half more years for the United 
States to satisfactorily comply with the DSB recommendation after the adoption of the panel 
report, the sheer fact of winning a WTO dispute concerning chronic trade barriers of the major 
trading partners furnished the Korean government with confidence in the new WTO dispute 
settlement system. Unfortunately, however, the dismal implementation by the United States after 
the panel proceeding compromised confidence of a relatively new user concerning the 
effectiveness and fairness of the WTO dispute settlement system.
77 In any case, US – DRAMS 
clearly led the Korean government to adopt a more legal approach by utilizing the WTO dispute 
settlement system to address foreign trade barriers in subsequent cases. In other words, the 
experience and confidence gained from this case clearly led the Korean government to move to 
the direction of ‘aggressive legalism’ in handling subsequent trade disputes.
78      
The  United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and 
                                             
75  The Appellate Body report for Korea – Soju case was circulated on 18 January 1999, while the panel 
report for US – DRAMS case was circulated on 29 January 1999. See WTO, Korea – Soju, WT/DS75, 
DS84/AB/R, adopted 17 February 1999. 
76  WTO, WT/DS99/12, dated 25 October 2000. 
77  For more positive assessment for Article 21.5 proceedings, see generally Jason Kearns and Steve 
Charnovitz, ‘Adjudicating Compliance in the WTO: A Review of DSU Article 21.5’, 5 Journal of 
International Economic Law 331 (2002). 
78  For the discussion of “aggressive legalism” by the Japanese government to deal with trade disputes, 
see Saadia M. Pekkanen, ‘Aggressive Legalism: The Rules of the WTO and Japan’s Emerging Trade 
Strategy’, 24 World Economy 707 (2001), at 707-737.   24
Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea (‘Korea-Stainless Steel’) case dealt with two separate 
antidumping actions by the US authorities concerning stainless steel plate in coils (‘plate’) and 
stainless steel sheet and strip in coils (‘sheet’). For the antidumping case on plate, the DOC 
selected January 1 to December 31, 1997 as the period of investigation and issued the final 
dumping margin of 16.26%. The antidumping case for sheet covered April 1, 1997 through March 
31, 1998 as the period of investigation and issued the final dumping margin of 58.79% for Taihan 
and 12.12% for other Korean exporters including POSCO. In this case, the panel was established 



























































Won/Dollar Exchange Rate(monthly avg.)
 Figure 1. Won/Dollar Exchange Rate Trends
80 
 
  The underlying economic situation for this case is remarkably aberrational.
81 The 
pertinent investigation periods included unprecedented fluctuation of exchange rates caused by 
the financial crisis. As illustrated in Figure 1, the value of the Korean currency, Won, 
precipitated to a half just in a time span of three months. The WTO panel found that the 
methodology adopted by the DOC to deal with such abnormity, including double currency 
conversion and the use of multiple averaging periods, were not consistent with the WTO 
obligations. Without the US’ appeal, the DSB adopted the panel report on February 1, 2001.
                                             
79  It took 126 days to compose the panel, which is so far the longest period of time required for the panel 
appointment in cases involving Korea. 
80 Bank of Korea, Principal Economic Indicators (March 2003). See also <http://www.bok.or.kr> (visited 
25 March 2003). 
81  Timothy Lane et al., ‘IMF-Supported Programs in Indonesia, Korea and Thailand: A Preliminary 
Assessment’, Occasional Paper 178 (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1999).   25
  This case showed how vulnerable exporters might be in terms of antidumping actions 
as the exchange rates became abnormally fluctuating. Since dumping margin calculation permits 
various price adjustment to find ‘ex-factory’ prices but no modification for volatile exchange 
rates except for averaging, unstable exchange rates can cause serious distortion in calculating 
dumping margins. This systemic problem may expose more exporters in developing countries 
that suffer from vacillating exchange rates to additional risks of being targeted by antidumping 
actions. Based on the Korean experience during the financial crisis, in which foreign exchange 
rates fluctuated at more than a normal or reasonable level, Members may consider suspension of 
antidumping actions at least for certain range of dumping margins that should reflect potential 
methodological errors. In other words, Members may consider an increase of the current de 
minimis level for a period with exchange rate aberration.   
  On June 13, 2000, Korea made its fourth consultation request, again with the United 
States, in respect of the definitive safeguard measure imposed on imports of circular welded 
carbon quality line pipe. The definitive safeguard measure actually imposed by the President on 
February 11, 2000 was much more restrictive than that recommended by the International Trade 
Commission (‘ITC’), disproportionately injuring the largest suppliers, i.e., Korean exporters.
82 
The exemption of Mexican and Canadian suppliers from the safeguard measure led them to 
become the largest and third largest suppliers.   
Korea considered that the US procedures and determinations to impose the safeguard 
measure, as well as the measure itself, contravened various obligations under the Agreement on 
Safeguards and the GATT 1994. The panel concluded that the US measure was imposed in a 
manner inconsistent with the WTO obligations. In the Appellate Body proceeding
83, the Korea’s 
argument on the permissible extent of a safeguard measure was accepted, which seems one of 
the key findings for the WTO jurisprudence on safeguard.
84  
It is noted that this appellate proceeding was the first WTO dispute settlement litigation 
handled entirely by Korean government officials. It was a substantial development for Korea in 
terms of capacity building for utilizing the WTO dispute settlement system, particularly 
considering the previous cases in which foreign legal counsels played primary roles in WTO 
litigations. Moreover, when considering the fact that Korea is one of the WTO Members that did 
                                             
82  The imports above the first 9,000 short tons from each country would be subject to a 19%, 15% and 
11% duty for the first, second and third year. See WTO Panel Report, United States – Definitive 
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea (‘US – Line 
Pipe’), WT/DS202/R, adopted 8 March 2002, para.2.5. 
83  WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Line Pipe, WT/DS202/AB/R, adopted 8 March 2002. The United 
States initially filed an appeal on 6 November 2001 (WT/DS202/7), but withdrew it for scheduling 
reasons on 13 November (WT/DS202/8). The appeal was re-filed on 19 November 2001 (WT/DS202/9). 
84 See generally Dukgeun Ahn, “A Critical Analysis of Interpretation and Application of WTO 
Agreement on Safeguards” (International Trade Law, Vol.41, 2001; in Korean).   26
contribute to set the procedural practices to permit private counsel in a dispute settlement 
proceeding, the outcome of the US – Line Pipe appellate proceeding substantially enhanced self-
confidence and capacity in terms of much needed legal expertise.     
When both parties agreed on the reasonable period of time for implementation with 
expiration on September 1, 2002, the arbitration under DSU Article 21.3 was suspended.
85 The 
US government agreed to increase the in-quota volume of imports to 17,500 tons and lower the 
safeguard tariff to 11%, with the termination due of March 1, 2003.
86 But, considering the 
original due date of the safeguard measure that was set at February 24, 2003, the practical 
impact of the WTO dispute settlement system was to increase the in-quota volume from 9,000 
to 17,500 tons only for the period of September 1, 2002 to February 24, 2003, while the latter 
measure remained until the end of February 2003. Thus, this case again illustrated the systemic 
problem in implementation of a safeguard dispute. 
On December 15, 2000, Korea requested consultations with the Philippines concerning 
the dumping decision of the Tariff Commission of the Philippines on polypropylene resins. This 
antidumping order was actually the first antidumping measure by the Philippines against Korean 
exporters, since the first antidumping investigation against Korean electrolytic tinplates was 
dismissed for lack of merit.
87  The Tariff Commission of the Philippines imposed the provisional 
antidumping duties on polypropylene resins ranging from 4.20% to 40.53% and subsequently 
the final duties at slightly lowered levels.
88 Following the consultation on January 19, 2001 
under the purview of the WTO dispute settlement system, the Philippines withdrew the 
antidumping order on November 8, 2001 and Korea did not pursue further action in the DSB.
89 
This case is so far the only trade dispute for Korea elevated to the formal dispute settlement 
procedure as opposed to a developing country.       
The fifth WTO complaint by Korea against the United States was also related to 
antidumping matters. On December 21, 2000, Korea, along with Australia, Brazil, Chile, 
European Communities, India, Indonesia, Japan and Thailand, requested consultations with the 
United States concerning the amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930, titled ‘Continued Dumping 
and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000’ that is usually referred to as the ‘Byrd Amendment’. By 
distributing the antidumping and countervailing duties to domestic petitioners, the Byrd 
Amendment aimed to create more incentives to bring trade remedy actions. As the third frequent 
target for antidumping and countervailing measures in the US market, Korean exporters were 
                                             
85  WTO, WT/DS202/17, dated 26 July 2002. 
86  WTO, WT/DS202/18, dated 31 July 2002. 
87  WTO, G/ADP/N/65/PHL, dated 21 September 2000. 
88  WTO, G/ADP/N/72/PHL, dated 6 March 2001. 
89  WTO, G/ADP/N/85/PHL, dated 22 February 2002.   27
very keen on the outcome of this case.
90     
The panel established by the requests from 9 Members was later merged with the panel 
requested by Canada and Mexico. The panel and the Appellate Body found that the Byrd 
Amendment was inconsistent with the Antidumping and SCM Agreement. Furthermore, the 
panel suggested that the United States bring the Byrd Amendment into conformity by repealing 
it. On April 2, 2003, the arbitrator was appointed to determine a reasonable period of 
implementation under DSU Article 21.3.   
Ironically, a subsidiary company of a Korean manufacturer received a substantial 
‘offset’ disbursement under the Byrd Amendment. Zenith Electronics owned by LG Electronics 
received the disbursement of $24.3 million in 2001 and $9 million in 2002 from antidumping 
duties collected on Japanese television imports. The offset payment for Zenith Electronics in 
2001 was indeed more than 10% of the total disbursement of $231.2 million in 2001.
91 In  2002, 
the total disbursement under the Byrd Amendment was increased to $329.8 million.
92    
  On March 20, 2002, Korea requested consultation with the United States regarding the 
definitive safeguard measures on the imports of certain steel products and the related laws 
including Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Section 311 of the NAFTA Implementation 
Act. The DSB established a single panel to include complaints by other Members such as the 
European Communities, Japan, China, Switzerland, Norway, New Zealand and Brazil.
93 In 
addition to most complainants that reserved third party rights, Taiwan, Cuba, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela also participated as third parties in the proceeding. On July 25, 
2002, the Director-General composed the panel. Taiwan later determined to become a more 
active participant and made an independent consultation request with the United States on 
November 1, 2002.
94   
  Concerning this US Section 201 action, the Korean government made the first trade 
                                             
90  For antidumping measures, exporters from China and Japan are more frequent targets than those from 
Korea in the US market. US countervailing measures have targeted Italy, India, Korea and France. WTO, 
‘Statistics on Anti-dumping’, <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm> and ‘Statistics on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’, 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/scm_stattab8_e.htm> (visited 9 April 2003).     
91  US Customs and Border Protection, ‘CDSOA FY2001 Disbursements Final’, 
<http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/xp/cgov/import/add_cvd/> (visited 10 April 2003). On the other hand, it 
is noted that only two ball bearing companies, Torrington and MPB (The Timken Company), received 
more offset payments in gross than Zenith Electronics in 2001. Their total disbursements amount to $62.8 
million and $25 million, respectively. But, the disbursement for Zenith Electronics is the second largest 
one in terms of individual claims, following $34.7 million offset payment for Torrington in relation to ball 
bearings dumping from Japan.     
92  US Customs and Border Protection, ‘CDSOA FY2002 Disbursements Final’, 
<http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/xp/cgov/import/add_cvd/> (visited 10 April 2003). 
93  WTO, WT/DS251/10, dated 12 August 2002. 
94  WTO, WT/DS274/1, dated 11 November 2002.   28
compensation request pursuant to Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards.
95 When the US 
government did not agree on satisfactory compensatory arrangements, several WTO Members, 





100, notified to 
the Council for Trade in Goods of proposed suspension of concessions. Instead of proposing 
suspension of concessions, the Korean government notified the Council for Trade in Goods of 
the agreement that the 90-day period set forth in Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards and 
Article XIX:3(a) of the GATT shall be considered to expire on March 19, 2005.
101 This 
agreement to postpone potential retaliation for about three years, however, practically wipes out 
all real impact on balancing trade interests, since the original safeguard measure is supposed to 
end on March 20, 2005.
102  In other words, the Korean government tried to avoid the possibility 
to actually exercise the suspension of concession against one of its major trading partners 
without the DSB authorization, while it still maintained a political gesture that it exercised a 
legal authority specifically enunciated under the Agreement on Safeguards.     
  As described above, Korea has had major problems regarding the US antidumping 
practices. In some sense, its experience as a complainant in the WTO dispute settlement system 
almost exclusively against US antidumping practices is puzzling because, during the period of 
January 1, 1995 to June 20, 2002, it was the European Communities that initiated the most 
antidumping investigations against exported products from Korea, and it was South Africa and 
India that actually imposed the most antidumping measures.
103  This fact seems to imply that the 
US market still occupies an unbalanced economic importance for Korea.
104  Currently, Korea is 
                                             
95  About 12 % of trade remedy measures against Korean exports are safeguard actions. For example, as 
of 31 December 2002, Korean exporters are subject to 10 safeguard measures and 5 investigations in 
India, United States, Venezuela, China, Argentina, Canada, and European Communities. Korea Trade 
Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), ‘Summary of Import Restrictions against Korean Exports 
2002’ (December, 2002; in Korean).  
96  WTO, G/C/10, dated 15 May 2002. 
97  WTO, G/C/15, dated 21 May 2002. 
98  WTO, G/C/16, dated 21 May 2002. 
99  WTO, G/C/17, dated 21 May 2002. 
100  WTO, G/C/18, dated 22 May 2002. 
101  WTO, G/C/12, dated 16 May 2002. On the other hand, Australia, Brazil and New Zealand extended 
the deadline for retaliation to 20 March 2005. See WTO, G/C/11, dated 16 May 2002 and G/C/13, 14, 
dated 17 May 2002. 
102  WTO, G/SG/N/10/USA/6, dated 14 March 2002. 
103  WTO, ‘Statistics on Anti-dumping’, <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm> (visited 
9 April 2003). 
 
<AD Actions against Korea (From 01/01/95 to 30/06/02)> 
 Argentina  Australia  EC  India  South  Africa  US  Others  Total 
AD Initiation  9  11  21  18  13  19  54  145 
AD Measures  6  4  9  13  13  11  18  74 
 
104  On the other hand, Japan, a country with similar trade structure and attitude toward trade dispute 
settlement, has shown much diverse interest as a complainant concerning its target markets. See generally   29
actively engaged in pushing the agenda to revise the Antidumping Agreement in the Doha 
Development Agenda.
105 
  For three cases in which the entire dispute settlement procedure including 
implementation ended, the major problem Korea faced was the failure to ensure prompt and 
effective compliance by a respondent. The implementation for the US –DRAMS and US – Line 
Pipe cases was in fact not much more than the mere expiration of the original trade remedy 
measures. This result raises concern for effectiveness and fairness of the WTO dispute 
settlement system, especially when dealing with the WTO litigation demands sizeable financial 
and human resources. In particular, the lack of legal systems to represent private parties’ interest 
in line with Section 301 and TBR procedures would inevitably result in a less enthusiastic 
approach for resorting to the legal activism for many WTO Members including Korea, because 
government officials in charge of WTO disputes may not have an incentive to initiate all those 




<Table 8. WTO Disputes Involving Philippines> 
 
As Complainant 
*Brazil - Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut    DS22  P/AB report 
United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products  
DS61 In  consultation
Australia - Certain Measures Affecting the Importation of Fresh 
Fruit and Vegetables   
DS270 In  panel 
Australia - Certain Measures Affecting the Importation of Fresh 
Pineapple  
DS271 In  consultation
 
As Respondent 




Philippines - Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Motor 
Vehicle Sector 
DS195/ US  In panel 
Philippines - Anti-Dumping Measures Regarding Polypropylene 
Resins from Korea 
DS215/ Korea  In consultation
* Cases for which panel reports were issued. 
 
The Philippines’ experience under the WTO dispute settlement system showed a 
typical pattern for developing country Members with comparative advantage in agricultural 
industry sectors. Four complaints against its trading partners were all regarding import 
restrictive measures on agricultural products. In contrast, the Philippines were challenged twice 
                                                                                                                                  
Iwasawa, above n. 55, 473. 
  
105  For the Korean proposal regarding antidumping issues, see, for example, WTO, WT/GC/W/235/Rev.1, 
dated 12 July 1999; TN/RL/W/6, dated 26 April 2002; TN/RL/W/10, dated 28 June 2002.   30
concerning its own import barriers for industrial sectors, although it was also challenged once 




Thailand is in some sense unique in a manner that they uses the WTO dispute 
settlement system. Thailand is currently the most active developing country complainant in the 
WTO. Whereas Thailand was challenged only once so far by Poland concerning antidumping 
measures, it made 10 consultation requests against other WTO Members. The EC has been the 
most frequent target of Thailand’s complaints. Other than the EC, Thailand’s complaints were 
raised against various countries, including Colombia, Egypt, Hungary, Turkey and the United 
States. It is noted that Thailand’s complaints are often raised against other developing countries. 
In terms of subject matters, Thailand’s dispute settlement experience also showed a typical 
pattern of developing countries by focusing mostly on foreign trade barriers on agricultural and 
textile products.     
 
<Table 9. WTO Disputes Involving Thailand> 
 
As Complainant 
EC - Duties on Imports of Rice  DS17  Inactive 
Hungary - Export Subsidies in Respect of Agricultural Products    DS35  Mutually 
resolved 
Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products    DS47  In consultation
*US - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products    DS58  P/AB report 
Colombia - Safeguard Measure on Imports of Plain Polyester 
Filaments from Thailand   
DS181 Inactive 
Egypt - Import Prohibition on Canned Tuna with Soybean Oil    DS205  In consultation
*US - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000    DS217  P/AB report 
EC - Generalized System of Preferences    DS242  In consultation
EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar    DS283  In consultation
EC - Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts    DS286  In consultation
 
As Respondent 
*Thailand - Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections 
of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland 
DS122/ Poland  P/AB report 




<Table 10-1. WTO Disputes As Complainants> 
China 
United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain 
Steel Products   
DS252 In  AB 
Taiwan   31
United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain 
Steel Products   
DS274 In  consultation 
Hong Kong, China 
Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products    DS29  In consultation 
Indonesia 
Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear    DS123  In consultation 
*United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000  DS217  P/AB report 
Malaysia 
*United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products  
DS58 P/AB  report 
Singapore    
Malaysia - Prohibition of Imports of Polyethylene and Polypropylene  DS1  Inactive 
* Cases for which panel reports were issued. 
 
  No WTO Member has raised a formal complaint against China or Taiwan yet although 
they joined the WTO more than a year and half ago. This does not mean that trade policy 
measures of both Members are completely consistent with the WTO disciplines. In fact, as 
many Members are concerned, these two Members with substantial trade volumes may still 
maintain numerous potentially controversial measures or laws, especially considering the short 
experience on multilateral trade disciplines. Although it is true that both Members have exerted 
strenuous efforts to bring their system into conformity with the WTO system, more dispute 
cases concerning both Members seem unavoidable for the future WTO dispute settlement 
system. In particular, the Chinese government has been very active in using trade remedy 
measures to protect domestic import markets.
106  Some of these measures may not be free from 
WTO challenges in the future.   
 
<Table 10-2. WTO Disputes As Respondents> 
Indonesia 
*Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile 
Industry 
DS54, DS64/ Japan 
DS55/ EC, DS59/ US 
P/AB report 
Malaysia 
Malaysia - Prohibition of Imports of Polyethylene and 
Polypropylene   
DS1/ Singapore  Inactive 
* Cases for which panel reports were issued. 
 
  Another interesting question is whether and how China would deal with Taiwan in 
terms of the WTO dispute settlement system. In case Taiwan raises a complaint against China 
and seeks to proceed to panel and the Appellate Body proceedings, there is no mechanism to 
block such procedures under the WTO dispute settlement system.
107 It would bring about a 
                                             
106  Up to the end of April 2003, the Chinese authority initiated 21 antidumping investigations. Among 
them, 17 cases involved Korean products.   
107  Under the GATT system, a respondent could block the proceeding by declining consensus for panel 
establishment. This was changed under the WTO dispute settlement system that mandates panel   32
diplomatically sensitive situation in which China and Taiwan stand against each other with 
equivalent status in an international forum, which may cause a very difficult political dilemma 
for these Members. Since the WTO is the only international organization of which Taiwan is a 
full Member, Taiwan may have strong incentives to use the WTO dispute settlement system to 
promote the image as a political entity that is on par with China.
108 It remains to be seen how 
these Members agree to address this problem.   
   
 
IV.    East Asia in the WTO DSU Negotiation 
 
The DSU review mandated by a 1994 Ministerial Decision started in the Dispute 
Settlement Body in 1997. The deadline stipulated as January 1, 1999 was extended to July 31, 
1999, but there was no agreement by then. In November 2001, at the Doha Ministerial 
Conference, Member governments agreed to negotiate to improve and clarify the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding and conclude the negotiation not later than May 2003. 
  East Asian Members have actively participated in various areas of the Doha 
negotiations, including reforming the dispute settlement system. In addition to Japan, Korea and 
Thailand that have often resorted to the WTO dispute settlement system, China and Taiwan are 
also making substantial contribution by submitting their own proposals to the DSU negotiation.     
Although they have shown different emphases on varying issues, their proposals 
invariably try to enhance efficiency and transparency of the dispute settlement mechanism, 
particularly with respect to the implementation phase of the current procedure. For example, 
Japan and Korea submitted elaborated proposals concerning Articles 21 and 22. The proposal by 
Japan includes a detailed provision for compliance panel procedures.
109  Korea proposed that the 
compliance panel proceed to determine the level of the nullification or impairment and to the 
extent that the legal findings and conclusions of the compliance panel are modified or reversed 
by the Appellate Body, thereby affecting the level of the nullification or impairment, the 
Appellate Body determine the final level of the nullification or impairment.
110  
China suggested augmentation of special and differential treatment in the DSU to 
developing-country Members, including the least developed countries.
111 Claiming that China 
                                                                                                                                  
proceedings, if requested by a complainant, after 60 day consultation period. For more detailed accounts 
on the WTO dispute settlement proceedings, see generally Jeff Waincymer, WTO Litigation: Procedural 
Aspects of Formal Dispute settlement (London: Cameron May, 2002). 
108  Qingjiang Kong, ‘Can the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism Resolve Trade Disputes between 
China and Taiwan?’, 5 Journal of International Economic Law 747, 756 (2002). 
109  WTO, TN/DS/W/32 (dated 22 January 2003). 
110  WTO, TN/DS/W/35 (dated 22 January 2003). 
111  WTO, TN/DS/W/57 (dated 19 May 2003).   33
is a developing-country Member, China proposed that developed-country Members exercise due 
restraint in cases against developing-country Members. In other words, developed-country 
Members shall not bring more than two cases to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body against a 
particular developing-country Member in one calendar year. Moreover, while time periods 
applicable under the DSU for dealing with disputes involving safeguard and anti-dumping 
measures shall be half of the normal timeframe, the shortened time-frame shall not apply to the 
defending party that is a developing-country Member. 
Taiwan made extensive proposal to improve third party rights in the WTO dispute 
settlement procedures.
112 But, Taiwan opposed some of the proposals made by other Members 
such as opening of meetings to the public, public access to submissions and developing 
guideline procedures for the handling of amicus curiae submissions.
113 
Malaysia made an interesting proposal concerning litigation costs.
114 It proposed that 
in a dispute involving a developing country Member and a developed country Member as a 
complaining party and as a party complained against, respectively, and where that dispute does 
not end with a panel or the Appellate Body finding against the former, the panel or the Appellate 
Body award litigation costs to the developing-country Member to the tune of US $500,000 or 
actual expenses, whichever is higher
115. The litigation costs shall include lawyers’ fees, charges 
and all other expenses for, preparation of necessary documents
116 and participation in, the 
consultations, panel and the Appellate Body proceedings. The litigation costs shall also include 
travel, hotel, per diem and other expenses for a reasonable number of the Capital based officials. 
In fact, litigation costs to deal with WTO disputes have become one of the most serious practical 
obstacles to utilize the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Since private attorneys were 
permitted to panel and Appellate Body proceedings in early WTO years, their roles have quickly 
become indispensable elements of WTO litigations, probably except for a handful of Members. 
The legal expenses to procure such professional lawyers turned out, however, to be sometimes 
way beyond the scope of budgetary constraints of developing countries. These problems led 
some WTO Members to establish the “Advisory Centre on WTO Law” on October 5, 2001. 
                                             
112  WTO, TN/DS/W/36 (dated 22 January 2003). 
113  WTO, TN/DS/W/25 (dated 27 November 2002). 
114  WTO, TN/DS/W/47 (dated 11 February 2003). 
115  The expenses shall be calculated for each stage of dispute settlement proceedings, which include 
consultation, panel and the Appellate Body proceedings as well as the proceedings under Articles 21.3(c), 
21.5, 22.6 and 25 of the DSU. The original panel and the panel established pursuant to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU shall take into account the expenses relating to the consultations preceding those panel proceedings 
for award of litigation costs. The award of litigation costs is binding on the parties and not subject to 
appeal. 
116  The documents include request for consultations, oral or written submissions and all other documents 
necessary for preparation and participation in the dispute settlement proceedings. They shall also include 
oral or written advice rendered prior to, during or after consultations, panel or the Appellate Body 
proceedings relating to the dispute.       34
Currently, Hong Kong, Philippines, and Thailand are signatories to the Centre. Thailand 
suggested that the Appellate Body be composed of nine persons, three of whom serve on any 
one case.
117 Furthermore, it proposed a new panel composition process, including a "Roster of 
Panel Chairs" comprised of individuals who may be appointed as Chair of a panel by lot.
118    
  At its meeting on July 24, 2003, the General Council of the WTO agreed to extend 
negotiations in the Dispute Settlement Body Special Session which is reviewing DSU. The 
timeframe was extended from May 31, 2003 to May 31, 2004. How much proposals to improve 
the DSU can actually be agreed by Members by May 2004 remains to be seen.   
 
 
V.  National Complaining Procedures for Private Parties 
 
  The WTO dispute settlement system is primarily for Member governments. In other 
words, private parties may not be able to bring complaints directly to the WTO dispute 
settlement system even if it is indeed private parties that are aggrieved by WTO inconsistent 
measures of other WTO Members. Those private parties have to persuade their own 
governments to raise complaints on behalf of their economic interests. This mechanism does not, 
however, function properly as the discretionary decision of Member governments on whether to 
bring a WTO complaint often does not stand in line with private parties’ requests. Since the 
WTO Agreement is not normally directly applicable, the lack of systemic nexus between the 
WTO dispute settlement system and private parties causes fundamental problems in the WTO 
system. This problem becomes more and more serious as the scope of the WTO system tends to 
expand by encompassing intrinsically private legal issues such as investment and competition. 
  Currently, the most notable examples of linking private parties to the WTO dispute 
settlement system are Section 301 mechanism of the United States and the Trade Barriers 
Regulation system of the European Communities. Even if the unilateral retaliation has been the 
focal point of the Section 301, the most important aspect of the Section 301 mechanism in terms 
of trade policy is the establishment of the systemic procedures under which private parties can 
force the government to act on their petitions. The European Communities initially introduced 
so-called “New Trade Policy Instrument” by Regulation 2641/84
119, but substantially modified 
it pursuant to the WTO Agreement and adopted “Trade Barriers Regulation (TBR)” system.
120 
                                             
117  WTO, TN/DS/W/30 (dated 22 January 2003). 
118  WTO, TN/DS/W/31 (dated 22 January 2003). 
119  Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2641/84 of 17 September 1984. 
120 Council Regulation (EC) No. 3286/94 of 22 December 1994. For a thorough overview of the TBR, 
see Marco Bronckers, “Enforcing WTO Law Through the EC Trade Barriers Regulation”, 3 International 
Trade Law & Regulation 76 (1997).   35
In both the United States and the European Communities, many WTO complaints have been 
indeed initiated by petitions under those systems. 
  Despite rather long history and experience under multilateral trade system, Japan and 
Korea have not yet prepared such mechanisms in domestic legal or institutional systems. Most 
other East Asian countries do not have such systems, either. Interestingly, China prepared a 
TBR-like system that would allow private parties to raise complaints against foreign trade 
barriers under systemic procedures and in turn lead to formal WTO complaints by the Chinese 
government. The “Provisional Regulations for Investigation on Foreign Trade Barriers” enacted 
from November 1, 2002 stipulates that natural or legal persons representing domestic industries 
as well as domestic industries or companies can apply for investigations. The investigation 
procedure under this regulation may not exceed 6 months and may be extended to 9 months in 
exceptional circumstances. Article 29 provides that the Ministry of Commerce (previously, 
MOFTEC) may take one of the following, if foreign trade barriers are found to be in violation 
of international agreements: 1) bilateral consultation, 2) multilateral dispute settlement, or 3) 
other necessary measures. Although the current provisions do not exclude unilateral retaliation 
by taking “other necessary measures”, the overall structure of the system is much more focused 
in connecting the WTO dispute settlement system and aggrieved domestic private parties. This 
development should give important lessons for other WTO Members in general and East Asian 





  The WTO dispute settlement system has become the core of the world trading system. 
Various trade disputes arising from divergent interpretation of the WTO agreements and de facto 
discriminatory impact of the domestic trade policy measures have been rectified by the legal 
rulings of the WTO panels and Appellate Body. Yet, there is huge discrepancy among the WTO 
Members, especially in East Asia, in the degree of utilizing the WTO dispute settlement system. 
Moreover, East Asian Members have shown strong tendency in settling the disputes rather than 
litigating the cases. This fact should not be construed to indicate that the WTO dispute 
settlement system has been malfunctioning to represent the legitimate WTO rights and interests 
in East Asia. To the contrary, it is shown that major economic sectors – industrial or agricultural 
– in East Asian Members have been able to use the WTO dispute settlement system for securing 
level playing field. The next question for these Members may be how to establish the domestic 
system to properly represent their private economic interests in a more balanced manner and 
how to make the WTO dispute settlement system a benign instrument for the entire economy,   36
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